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Prevention is political: political party
affiliation predicts perceived risk and prevention
behaviors for COVID-19
Marc T. Kiviniemi1*, Heather Orom2, Jennifer L. Hay3 and Erika A. Waters4

Abstract
Background: Many US politicians have provided mixed messages about the risks posed by SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19
and whether and to what extent prevention practices should be put in place to prevent transmission. This politicization of the virus and pandemic may affect individuals’ risk perceptions and willingness to take precautions. We examined how political party affiliation relates to risk perception for one’s own and other people’s likelihood of SARS-CoV-2
infection/COVID-19 illness.
Methods: We surveyed members of a nationally-representative, probability-sampling based survey panel (N = 410)
to examine their risk perceptions, precautionary behaviors, and political party affiliation.
Results: The more strongly one identified as a Republican, the less risk one perceived to oneself from SARS-CoV-2/
COVID-19 and the less risk one perceived other people faced. Moreover, those identifying as more strongly Republican engaged in fewer preventive behaviors.
Conclusions: This differential response may affect virus transmission patterns and poses a considerable challenge for
health communications efforts.
Keywords: Risk perception, Political affiliation, Preventive behaviors, COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2
Background
As of November 23, 2021, there were over 43.6 million
SARS-CoV-2 infections in the US [1, 2] and more than
700,000 COVID-19 deaths [1, 3]. Both the infection and
the death rates likely substantially underestimate the true
population impact given that there are nearly 300,000
excess deaths in the US since the start of the pandemic
[4, 5]. In addition to the mortality burden, there are longterm cardiac, respiratory, and other health consequences
for COVID-19 patients [6, 7]. In many areas of the US,
infection rates have shifted over time with changes in
policy-mandated preventive strategies, decreasing when
*Correspondence: Marc.Kiviniemi@uky.edu
1
University of Kentucky, 151 Washington Avenue, Lexington, KY 40536,
USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article

prevention-oriented policies were in place and then
increasing again as prevention strategies were eased [8].
A centerpiece of public health strategies to control
infectious disease spread is either recommending or
mandating that members of the public engage in protective behavior to prevent disease transmission. In the case
of COVID-19, staying 6 ft apart, wearing masks, working
remotely when possible, avoiding public gatherings, and
other strategies have been endorsed and communicated
to the public by CDC, FEMA, WHO, and other national
and international public health agencies [9–11]. These
preventive strategies are effective at slowing the rate of
COVID-19 infection [12–14]. However, for infectious
disease prevention behaviors to be effective, they must be
undertaken consistently by a sufficient proportion of the
population to slow transmission [15–17].
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Social and Cultural Influences on Construction of Risk
Perceptions and Preventive Behaviors.
Most theoretical and empirical treatments of risk
perception focus on individual cognitive and reasoning processes as the key determinant of a person’s risk
perceptions [18, 19]. In contrast, the social amplification of risk framework [20, 21] describes the process
by which scientific evidence, the ways in which people
obtain information (e.g., news media), and political and
cultural forces shape how individuals interpret and prioritize health risk information. According to this framework, perceptions of risk can be amplified or attenuated
through social processes that influence: 1) the availability
of risk information (e.g., via media and political sources)
and 2) society’s response to the information (e.g., discourse about the veracity of the risk information in the
media and interactions with cultural and peer groups
[20]).
Influential communicators such as social/activist
organizations and opinion leaders among social groups
or organizations are key sources of information and can
influence discourse surrounding risk information [21].
For example, political groups, parties, and leaders are
prominent examples of influential communicators who
may shape how their members and affiliates interpret
risk information. These amplification and attenuation
processes through influential communicators likely contribute to an alignment between, on one hand, people’s
political affiliation and their underlying values and, on
the other hand, their perceived risk.
During the pandemic, politicians in multiple countries
have sought to control the amount and kind of information the public received about COVID-19 risk as well as
actively disputing scientific discourse about the risk. Residents of several countries received messages from political leaders that minimized risk and raised doubt about
preventive strategies. For example, the Prime Minister
of Great Britain, Boris Johnson, publicly announced that
he would not engage in social distancing and, specifically, would continue to shake hands [22] less than a week
before the British government began to plan policy strategies to prevent transmission [23]. In Brazil, President
Jair Bolsonaro made public statements that minimized
the perception that the virus posed a risk, comparing it to
the flu [24] and actively arguing against preventive policy
strategies that were being put in place in Brazilian cities [25, 26]. Similar minimizing and contradictory statements can be found from the leaders of other countries
[27].
In the United States, the country of focus in the current study, then President Donald Trump regularly made
public statements that downplayed the threat posed by
the virus [28, 29] in terms of both severity, comparing it
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to the flu [30], and the number of cases and deaths [31].
President Trump also downplayed the importance of preventive actions to protect against transmission, including
arguing against mask mandates [32], pushing for early
easing of stay at home and business closure orders [33],
and holding public gatherings in spite of social distancing policies in place [34]. The President admitted to being
motivated to downplay the risk despite receiving clear
warnings about the severity and seriousness of the spread
of COVID-19 ([35] p. xviii).
In addition to risk perception, individuals’ decision
making about COVID-19 prevention behaviors has taken
place in the context of a complex, saturated, fast-moving
information environment, with multiple and sometimes
contradictory messages from traditional media, social
media, and government messaging [36]. There is evidence that political messaging has an influence on behavior for individuals who support the politician conveying
the messaging. Specifically, a study of the impact of President Trump’s anti-vaccination messaging found that the
exposure to the messages negatively impact vaccination
engagement intentions, but only on the part of voters
who voted for him [37].
Based on the social amplification of risk framework,
one would expect that the selective communication
of risk information by politicians and the conflating of
politics and public health in media messaging would
influence the public’s perceptions of risk and their decision making about behavioral strategies to mitigate risk.
Moreover, given the current US phenomenon where
some news media outlets provide partisan lenses on
issues, one would expect this effect to be exacerbated as
news media “amplify” the messaging about risk perception [38]. Thus, one would predict that political affiliation
would, by affecting exposure, attention, processing, and
response to SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 messages, influence
risk perception and behavior.
Given the empirical evidence and plausible, theoryderived mechanisms for the role of social amplification
in risk perception and decision making about risk reduction messages, we hypothesize that political party affiliation will relate to engagement in preventive measures for
SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19, such that – given the predominant minimization themes in President Trump’s statements, those who identify more strongly as Republicans
will be less likely to engage in preventive measures and
will perceive less risk relative to those who identify more
strongly as Democrats.
We examined whether Americans’ political party identification is related to perceived risk of SARS-CoV-2
infection, the severity of COVID-19 illness, and engagement in a range of preventive behaviors. Although there
have been examinations of how political affiliation relates
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to support for preventive measures against COVID-19
(e.g., policy measures to restrict gatherings, mask wearing), our approach adds to this literature in two ways.
First, we utilize a nuanced, quasi-continuous assessment of strength of party affiliation, allowing for an
understanding of how strength of political beliefs affect
responses to COVID-19. Second, we examine the effects
of political partisanship on risk perceptions for COVID19 infection in addition to support for preventive measures, adding to the understanding of how politicians’ risk
minimizing messages might affect individuals’ perceptions of the risks posed by COVID-19.

Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional, population-representative national survey of US adults. The study was reviewed
and determined exempt by the University of Kentucky
Institutional Review Board.
Participants

A random sample of 410 members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel [39] were surveyed by Ipsos. KnowledgePanel
is a survey panel recruited using probability-based sampling techniques. The sampling frame for the panel is
therefore population representative of US adults aged 18
and older and non-institutionalized. The survey was conducted over 6 days in mid-June 2020. Given the novelty
of COVID-19 risk perceptions and behaviors at the time,
there were not existing data on which to base an effect
size estimate. Therefore, the necessary sample size was
calculated to allow for an 80% power to detect a “small
effect” (Cohen’s f 2 > = 0.02) for the relation between party
affiliation an outcomes.
Measures
Political affiliation

Political affiliation was assessed using the methods of the
American National Election Studies [40]. Participants
were first asked to indicate whether they identified as a
Democrat, Republican, Independent, another party, or
no preference. Those indicating Democrat or Republican were then asked a follow-up question in which they
were asked whether their party affiliation was “strong”
or “not very strong”. Those indicating independent were
then asked whether they more strongly identified with
the Republican or the Democratic party. These two
questions were used to create a 6-point party affiliation
measure ranging with levels of Strong Republican, Weak
Republican, Independent-Lean Republican, Independent
Lean Democrat, Weak Democrat, and Strong Democrat.
Only 11 of the 410 respondents reported no preference
or another party affiliation (2.6% of the sample, a percentage consistent with other nationally-representative
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assessments of party affiliation [41]). Given their very
small number, these respondents were not included in
the political affiliation analyses.
Risk perception

We assessed risk perception for two different referents
– participants’ perception of their own risk for SARSCoV-2 infection and their perception of the risk for an
average person in the US (other risk). We asked about
four different components of risk perception that have
all been shown to be important in behavioral adoption.
First, we asked participants to report perceptions of the
absolute risk for infection using a measure modified from
the Health Information National Trends Survey [42,
43] (“How likely are you to get COVID-19 in the next 6
months?”). Second, we asked participants to report the
how much fear they experienced concerning the virus
[44] (“How afraid are you of getting COVID-19 in the
next 6 months?”). Third, we asked participants to provide
a gist-based assessment of how likely they felt infection
was to happen to them [45, 46] (“How easily do you feel
you could get COVID-19 in the next 6 months?”). Fourth
and finally, we asked participants to report how severe
infection would be were it to occur to them (Modified
from [47]; “If you were to get COVID-19 in the next 6
months, how serious would it be?”). Each risk perception question was assessed with a four-point scale, with a
score of 1 indicating the lowest level of perceived risk and
a score of 4 indicating the highest level of perceived risk.
Preventive behavior

Participants reported their engagement in 10 preventive
behaviors over the previous week. The ten behaviors were
drawn from public health guidance at the time of the survey and included behaviors related to sanitization (e.g.,
wash hands), transmission control (e.g., wear mask), and
social distancing (e.g., avoid visiting with others in person). The full list of behaviors can be found in Table 1.
For each behavior, participants were asked if they had
done each behavior in the past 7 days (yes/no). Analyses
include both dichotomous individual behavior measures for each individual behavior as well as a count of
the number of the ten behaviors in which participants
engaged.
Analysis

The IPSOS KnowledgePanel survey team calculated
adjusted design weights to address potential differential non-response to the survey. These adjusted design
weights were calculated by assessing the distribution
of US adults from the most recent fielding of the Current Population Survey. All reported analyses were
conducted using STATA version 16.1 (Stata Corp.,
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Table 1 Percentage of population engaging in each preventive behavior, by political party identification, June 2020. Bolded numbers
indicate a statistically significant relation between party identification and engagement in behavior
Preventive
Behavior

Overall

Political Party Identification

Relation of
Identification
and Behavior

Strong
Republican

Weak
Republican

Independent Independent Weak
Republican
Democrat
Democrat

Strong
Democrat

OR (95% CI)

% population
engaging in
behavior

% population
engaging in
behavior

% population %
engaging in
population
behavior
engaging in
behavior

%
population
engaging in
behavior

% population % population
engaging in
engaging in
behavior
behavior

Avoid Shopping

36.3

29.6

25.4

30.0

42.9

38.0

46.2

1.18 (1.01,
1.39)

Avoid InPerson Work

56.6

36.0

53.4

60.8

53.9

60.0

69.0

1.23 (1.05,
1.44)

Avoid Touching Face

63.0

53.9

62.5

56.1

59.2

67.9

75.4

1.14 (0.97, 1.32)

Encourage
63.8
Family to Stay
Home

43.9

61.9

39.9

68.3

79.5

87.5

1.46 (1.25,
1.72)

Avoid Visiting 65.2
with Others in
Person

48.8

65.3

60.2

75.9

57.6

80.0

1.17 (1.02,
1.35)

Disinfect
Surfaces

76.1

77.8

72.0

65.1

86.3

68.0

85.8

0.98 (0.82, 1.18)

Avoid Public
Transit

81.3

68.1

75.5

73.1

89.0

84.9

94.2

1.33 (1.11,
1.60)

Wearing Mask 86.6

70.1

86.9

78.6

95.1

92.2

96.4

1.44 (1.14,
1.83)

Use Hand
Sanitizer

87.6

82.9

90.9

85.0

91.3

83.9

91.7

1.08 (0.87, 1.33)

Wash Hands

98.0

100

100

99.1

100

91.8

97.1

0.53 (0.34,
0.84)

All reported analyses control for age, education, ethnicity, gender, income, and rural/urban residence

College Station, TX) and incorporated design weights
to provide population representative descriptive and
inferential estimates. Given that political affiliation is
not independent of demographic characteristics, all
reported analyses control for age, education, ethnicity,
gender, income, and rural/urban residence.
To examine the relation between political affiliation
and engagement in preventive behaviors, we estimated
linear regression models for the overall number of preventive behaviors participants reported. The six-level
party identification variable was used as a continuous
predictor variable, following the ANES recommendations, and the number of behaviors reported was
modelled as a continuous outcome variable. We then
estimated a separate logistic regression model for each
of the individual behaviors, with behavioral engagement as a dichotomous (no, yes) outcome variable and
party identification as a continuous predictor variable.
To identify the relation between political affiliation and risk perception, we estimated linear regression models for each component of perceived risk and

for each referent target. In each model, perceived risk
(e.g., absolute risk for the average person in the us) was
modelled as a continuous outcome variable and political affiliation was modelled as a continuous predictor
variable.

Results
Six hundred eighty-three adults drawn from a representative sample of the Knowledge Panel were invited to participate. The survey was completed by 410 participants
(completion rate of 60% [48]). The weighted demographics of the sample, per sampling design, mirror those of the
US population. Of particular importance for this paper,
17% of the population identified as strongly Republican,
10% as weakly Republican, 20% as Independent/Lean
Republican, 15% as Independent/Lean Democrat, 15% as
weakly Democrat, and 23% as strongly Democrat.
Perceived risk

Individuals’ perceptions of their own personal risk,
their degree of feeling fear about the possibility of
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infection, and their feelings of risk are reported in
Table 2. As indicated by the positive slopes for the
relation of political affiliation (in which higher numbers indicate more strongly Republican affiliation)
and risk (where higher numbers indicate greater risk),
for all three categories of risk, the sense of personal
risk of infection rises as one shifts from more strongly
Republican to more strongly Democratic Party
identification.
Also reported in Table 2 are individuals’ perceptions
of the average US adult’s risk, their degree of feeling fear
about the possibility of infection for the average adult,
and their feelings of risk for the average adult. As with
personal risk, the perception of the average US adult
risk of infection rises steadily as one shifts from more
strongly Republican to more strongly Democratic Party
identification.
Table 2 contains associations between political affiliation and perceptions of how serious/severe an infection
would be for both the individual respondent and the
average US adult. As with risk perception, perceptions
of both own and other severity increase as party identification moves from more strongly Republican to more
strongly Democratic.
Preventive behaviors

The number of preventive behaviors participants
reported engaging in as a function of party identification is presented in Fig. 1. Although respondents
of all political party identifications reported some
preventive behaviors, as can be seen in the figure, the
number of preventive behaviors increases as party

identification shifts from more strongly Republican
to more strongly Democratic; linear trend b = 0.30,
t(396) = 3.59, p < .001 (95% CI 0.14, 0.47). In followup analyses, both the independent-leaning Democrat
and the strong Democrat categories were significantly different than the strongly Republican (both
t(396) > 3.06, both p < 0.01).
Table 1 reports the percentage of respondents
reporting engaging in each individual behavior in the
past 7 days, separated by political party identification. For six of the ten preventive behaviors, engagement in the behavior became significantly more
likely as one shifted from stronger identification
with the Republican Party to stronger identification
with the Democratic Party (e,g, 80% of strong Democrats reported avoiding in person visits, whereas
only 48% of strong Republicans reported the same
behavior; ORs range from 1.18 to 1.53; the measure
of party affiliation ranges from strongly Republican
to strongly Democratic, so ORs above 1 indicate that
behavior becomes more likely as one moves toward
being more strongly Democratic). The only opposite effect was for hand washing, where likelihood
became significantly lower with a shift from Republican to Democratic identification (OR 0.53). There
was not a significant difference for disinfecting surfaces, avoiding touching face, or use of hand sanitizers. Note that the analysis for handwashing did NOT
include demographic covariates, because so few participants reported not handwashing that there were
multiple missing cells for demographics/behavior
combinations.

Table 2 Perceived personal and average US risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, by political party identification. Bolded numbers indicate a
statistically significant relation between party identification and perception of risk
Political Party Identification

Self

Relation of
Identification and
Risk Perception

Strong
Republican

Weak
Republican

Independent Independent Weak Democrat Strong
Republican
Democrat
Democrat

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Slope (95% CI)

Mean (SD)

Absolute Risk

1.76 (0.67)

2.05 (0.66)

1.82 (0.79)

1.97 (0.53)

2.16 (0.71)

1.94 (0.83)

0.084 (0.032, 0.14)

Fear

1.47 (0.63)

1.83 (0.76)

1.63 (0.62)

2.14 (0.91)

2.49 (0.95)

2.52 (1.04)

0.17 (0.12, 0.23)

Feelings

1.66 (0.81)

1.92 (0.72)

1.66 (0.67)

1.98 (0.64)

2.08 (0.84)

1.98 (0.76)

0.082 (0.031, 0.13)

Severity

2.26 (1.04)

2.47 (1.03)

2.18 (0.85)

2.71 (0.99)

2.75 (0.84)

2.91 (0.98)

0.13 (0.59, 0.20)

Average US
Absolute Risk 2.19 (0.74)

2.79 (0.78)

2.62 (0.68)

3.05 (0.76)

3.20 (0.75)

3.11 (0.86)

0.18 (0.072, 0.18)

Fear

2.05 (0.75)

1.80 (0.73)

2.41 (0.71)

2.65 (0.96)

2.67 (0.88)

0.16 (0.11, 0.22)

1.68 (0.76)

Feelings

1.88 (0.55)

2.33 (0.86)

2.20 (0.73)

2.73 (0.60)

2.96 (0.76)

2.75 (0.81)

0.13 (0.081, 0.182)

Severity

2.34 (1.03)

2.65 (0.84)

2.49 (0.80)

2.99 (0.69)

3.04 (0.73)

3.24 (0.76)

0.13 (0.074, 0.19)

All reported analyses control for age, education, ethnicity, gender, income, and rural/urban residence
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Fig. 1 Number of Preventive Behaviors By Political Party Identification

Discussion
Political party affiliation was consistently related to the
degree of risk people perceived from SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 disease. This finding was consistent
across multiple components of risk perception and for
both perceptions of the person’s own risk and perceptions of risk to other people. Moreover, party affiliation
was associated with the number of preventive behaviors
a person engaged in and, for most the individual preventive behaviors, with the probability that a given person
engaged in each individual behavior.
These findings are consistent with both laypeople’s
observations of differences in behavior and with press
reports over the course of the pandemic. In addition,
they mirror non peer-reviewed reports [49]. There has
been parallel work at a community/geographical level
of analysis showing that the overall political makeup of
counties in the US influences the degree to which residents restricted mobility during stay at home orders [50]
and engaged in social distancing [51]. Importantly, to our
knowledge this paper represents the first report from a
nationally-representative, probability-based sample to
examine both risk perceptions and preventive behaviors,
thus providing strong descriptions of the effects of partisanship on risk perceptions and preventive behaviors
among the American public. In addition, the finding that
partisanship affects both beliefs about risk and actions

that are intended to mitigate risk highlights that complex
and multifaceted ways in which public responses to the
pandemic have become politicized. Also, we find that
our effects extend past perceptions of one’s own risk to
the little studied but, in the context of infectious disease,
equally important construct of perceived risk to others.
Finally, our work extends beyond previous studies focusing on single behavioral responses (e.g., social distancing [51], vaccination [52] to demonstrate a remarkably
consistent partisanship effect across a range of preventive behaviors with very different levels of effort, social
involvement, etc. Each of these characteristics increases
confidence in the conclusion that politicization of the
coronavirus pandemic and of preventive measures influences the way in which the American public’s responses
to the pandemic have played out over the past several
months.
Finally, although our findings are framed in the context of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19, they are likely to extend
to other scientific and public health issues that become
politicized. As described in the introduction, President
Trump’s anti-vaccination Twitter messages have had a
demonstrable effect on childhood vaccination attitudes
of his supporters [37]. Politicization of public health has
occurred in the past in response to such now commonplace measures as motorcycle helmet laws, milk pasteurization, water fluoridation, and mandatory seat belt use
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in automobiles [53–55]. Thus, the implications of these
findings extend past the current pandemic to the more
general environment around science, public health, public policy, and community action to protect health and
well-being.
Implications

The current SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 public health
emergency provides a clear illustration that social factors,
including political party identification and the messaging
and activities of politicians and leaders from those parties, influence risk perceptions and preventive behavior.
There are, of course, multiple plausible mechanisms
that might explain the effect. First, as discussed in the
introduction, President Trump and other politicians
directly provided messaging about the pandemic. The
President’s messaging overwhelmingly focused on minimizing perceptions of risk and in some cases directly
undermining public health messaging about precautionary behaviors [35]. Partisan messaging from both politicians and the media includes false risk dichotomies. For
example, politicians downplayed the risk of the virus to
the public amplified their negative economic impact as
summarized by the President’s tweet that “WE CANNOT
LET THE CURE BE WORSE THAN THE PROBLEM
ITSELF”. Such sentiment was echoed in the statements
of governors who resisted shutdowns even in the face of
rapidly increasing virus spread. Analysis of politicians’
messaging showed that Democratic members of Congress communicated about the health-related and riskrelated aspects of the pandemic both earlier and more
than their Republican counterparts, who were more
likely to focus on business and economy messaging [56].
Because source credibility is a key factor in interpretation of information [57, 58], the matching of more health
and risk focused messaging from Democratic leaders
being seen as credible by those affiliating with the Democratic party versus risk minimizing messaging from those
seen as credible by those identifying as Republicans
could account for the findings we report here. Consistent
with this argument, recent work using statements by then
candidate Trump showed that regardless of the truth
or falsehood of the statement, Trump supporters more
strongly believed in the statement when it was attributed
to the president than when it was not [59]. When media
outlets and politicians selectively communicate risk
information this is likely to attenuate perceptions of risk
to a greater degree among those who most trust these
sources - in this case Republicans.
In addition, direct spreading of misinformation about
SARS-CoV-2 infection prevention as well as COVID-19
severity and treatment has been a prominent feature of
the media environment [60, 61]. Some of this has resulted
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in illness, injury, or death to individuals who acted based
upon it [62, 63]. In the early stages of the pandemic,
media outlets with a more right-wing/conservative leaning orientation discussed COVID-19 misinformation
more frequently than did those outlets that were more
left-wing/liberal leaning [38]. President Trump was a key
spreader of this misinformation, both through his Twitter
account and through amplification in traditional medial
sources. The President himself was cited as an information source by 37.9% of media articles containing misinformation [64]. Such scientific misinformation is likely to
undermine trust in science, and trust in science is associated with following recommendations for disease prevention [65]. Susceptibility to misinformation may be
even higher when it is presented by a communicator who
is aligned with the recipient’s partisan position, as is the
case for Republicans for communications from President
Trump, since accepting misinformation is more likely
when the recipient attends to ancillary cues (like partisanship) rather than focusing on judging the accuracy of
the message [66].
Finally, ideological differences or other factors may
underlie both political party affiliations and risk perceptions and behavioral responses. Public health interventions are shaped and constrained by the tension between
individuals’ rights and community-level goals of protecting the public health [53, 67, 68]. Ideological and political arguments between individual rights and community
safety have impacted implementation of public health
actions [53, 69]. In the US, more politically conservative individuals expressed lower willingness to vaccinate,
a relation that is partly related to lower trust in government medical officials [70]. This tension has been seen
in early responses to COVID-19, with some state and
national leaders opposing public health mandates on
personal liberty grounds [29]. Similar to the COVID-19
opposition, there has been a trend in anti-vaccination
messaging towards more policy-focused arguments [71].
In addition, factors such as health literacy, general perceptions of health, or broader beliefs about the nature of
health might differ across party lines.
Opposition to public health mandates are problematic
during pandemics because policy level interventions,
many of which mandate engagement in or avoidance
of particular behaviors [72], have profound effects on
behavior. In the context of COVID-19, key policies that
may affect transmission include mandated mask wearing, closure of non-essential businesses and activities,
social distancing requirements, screening for disease, and
testing. The polarization of people’s beliefs about these
threats resulting from politicized messaging creates barriers to coordinated public health responses to mitigate
the pandemic.
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